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INTRODUCTION 
Within the past several years, state attorneys general filed two 
high-profile common law tort lawsuits against major sources of green-
house gas (GHG) emissions.  In 2003, the attorneys general of New 
York, California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, and Wisconsin and the City Attorney for New York filed suit 
against five major electric power generators located in the Midwest.  
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ fossil-fuel-fired generating 
facilities constitute a public nuisance under state and federal common 
law and requested that the defendants abate carbon dioxide emissions 
at each of their plants.1  In 2006, the State of California sued six major 
vehicle manufacturers, claiming that the “massive” quantities of GHGs 
emitted by automobiles produced by the companies contribute to the 
public nuisance of global warming.  California is requesting monetary 
damages as well as other appropriate relief.2
Perhaps the most striking feature of these lawsuits is their bold at-
tempt to address a modern environmental problem of global propor-
 † Professor of Law, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona.  I would 
like to thank David Adelman, Dan Dobbs, Daniel Farber, Barak Orbach, and Scott 
Saleska for their comments on, and contribution to, the ideas presented in this paper 
as well as the participants in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium, 
Responses to Global Warming:  The Law, Economics, and Science of Climate Change.  In addi-
tion, I am indebted to Tiffany Bartz, who provided invaluable research assistance. 
1 Complaint at 43-49, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04-5669).  This lawsuit is currently on appeal after the district 
court dismissed the complaint under the political question doctrine.  Am. Elec. Power 
Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274; Brief of Amici Curiae U.S. Senator James M. Inhofe and 
the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Supporting 
Affirmance of the District Court at 4-5, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 05-
5104 (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 2006) (agreeing with the lower court that plaintiffs presented a 
political question). 
2 Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment at 2, California ex rel. Lockyer 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 06-05755 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2006). 
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tions—climate change—through the parochial apparatus of the 
common law tort system.  This is all the more remarkable as the inter-
national community, the federal government, and state regulators are 
simultaneously struggling to address climate change, with a mixed re-
cord of success.  Although nations representing approximately one-
third of the world’s emissions are now subject to the Kyoto Protocol, 
the United States—the world’s largest national emitter of GHGs—has 
neither ratified Kyoto nor adopted a mandatory program to control 
domestic emissions.  Some states within the United States are attempt-
ing to fill this gap with state-level regulation and, now, state-initiated 
common law litigation against individual emitters. 
Commentators generally agree that state-by-state regulation is not 
a substitute for a comprehensive federal program.  Nevertheless, the 
question remains whether state-level actions to address climate change 
can help bring us closer to the development of a mandatory federal 
climate change program.  A follow-up question is whether, if so, state-
level positive regulation and state-level common law litigation may be 
harmonized in a manner so as to reach this goal more effectively and 
efficiently.  Because some aspects of these questions are the subject of 
prior scholarship,3 this Article will focus on two particular aspects of 
these larger questions:  1) in what way is common law litigation similar 
to or different from state-level positive regulation in terms of its po-
tential to influence the development of a federal regulatory regime, 
and 2) what are the benefits of and barriers to adopting, in the com-
mon law context, the same remedies being considered and adopted in 
the regulatory context? 
I argue here that, like state positive climate change regulation, 
state-initiated climate change litigation fills a niche created by the 
need to address this global environmental problem in the absence of 
federal action.  Both can function as an intermediate step between no 
regulation and a federal program.  While it is possible both may sur-
vive, both may also be preempted by an eventual federal regulatory 
program.  Under the dominant theory regarding the influence of 
state-level action upon federal legislation, state-initiated common law 
climate change litigation now being pursued is likely to be just as, if 
not more, effective than positive regulation in terms of its potential to 
trigger a federal regulatory response.  This is largely because the tar-
3 See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons:  
The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 187-89 (2005) (arguing that sub-
global regulation is both “economically rational” and “a good policy choice”). 
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gets of the state-level litigation are out-of-state companies, a character-
istic that is likely to accentuate the dynamics that could trigger a fed-
eral regulatory response.  In sum, state-level litigation should be 
thought of as a component of a state-level regulatory program with at 
least the same potential for influencing the creation and content of a 
federal regulatory program as state positive regulation. 
Second, I will argue that not only should common law and positive 
regulatory remedies be harmonized in the circumstances presented by 
climate change, but a unique characteristic of GHGs—their fungibil-
ity—makes possible incorporation into common law remedies the 
leading compliance option being employed and considered in the 
regulatory context:  the use of tradable emissions offsets.  Such an op-
tion would be in contrast to the usual remedy in a public nuisance 
suit:  alterations in the defendant’s own operations that abate its con-
tribution to the public nuisance.4  The option to use third-party-
generated emissions offsets allows the defendant to maintain its cur-
rent operations unchanged and pay another source of GHGs to abate 
its emissions.  This remedy achieves the same environmental result as 
an unadorned abatement requirement, but at a potentially cheaper 
cost.  In addition to efficiency, however, incorporation of this option 
into common law remedies might actually trigger a GHG emissions 
trading market.5  Such a market could function until the time that a 
federal regulatory program is enacted.  Given that a federal program 
is likely to institute emissions trading, any market so created would 
enhance the success of the subsequent regulatory program. 
Harmonizing state regulatory and litigation approaches to climate 
change in a manner that could possibly jumpstart an emissions trad-
ing regime will make the best use of this intermediate time period 
during which Congress is considering the enactment of a GHG emis-
sions cap-and-trade program but has yet to amass the consensus 
needed for such a program to become law.  While Congress continues 
to debate the merits and design of a cap-and-trade program,6 other 
4 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90, at 
643 (5th ed. 1984) (“The equitable remedy of injunction to enjoin a public nuisance 
developed early in the history . . . of equity jurisprudence . . . .”). 
5 See infra Part III. 
6 With the recent endorsement of several major U.S. corporations, the United 
States may actually be getting near to legislating a climate cap-and-trade program.  See 
Business Leaders Urge Climate Action, ENV’T NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 22, 2007, http:// 
www.ens-newswire.com/ens/feb2007/2007-02-22-01.asp (noting ninety major interna-
tional corporations and organizations, including Citigroup, General Electric, Rolls-
Royce, Volvo, and the World Council of Churches, call on governments to reduce 
  
1566 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1563 
 
governments that are subject to the Kyoto Protocol, most notably the 
European Union (EU), are already implementing such a program.7  
Each day that passes in which the United States lacks a comparable 
program accentuates the gap between the developing carbon-trading 
expertise of U.S. businesses and regulators and those of other nations. 
While this disparity works to the United States’ comparative disad-
vantage, it also has certain short-term advantages.  By serving as a 
source of preapproved emissions reduction credits, the existence of 
the EU trading market (as well as the voluntary markets that have re-
cently appeared in the United States) helps make possible a judicially 
initiated emissions trading market.8  Thus, a judicially prompted GHG 
emissions trading market uses both time and opportunity wisely; with 
the help of more-developed emissions trading regimes in other parts 
of the world, it fills the existing federal regulatory gap with the very 
same policy that the federal government is likely to adopt, thereby 
smoothing the transition to that inevitable policy result. 
Much of this Article is devoted to providing a rationale for courts’ 
incorporation of emissions offsets as a compliance option in public 
nuisance climate change litigation, the potential barriers to courts’ 
willingness to adopt this remedy, and strategies to overcome judicial 
reluctance.  While it will be necessary at times to discuss some aspects 
of the plaintiff’s prima facie case for public nuisance, such as the man-
ner in which the fungibility of GHG emissions reduces the plaintiff’s 
burden of establishing causation, I have left the comprehensive analy-
sis of these elements of the plaintiff’s case to the more-capable talents 
and labors of others.9
GHG emissions and increase energy efficiency); see also Developers Hopeful About a U.S. 
Carbon-Trading Market, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at C2 (describing the U.S. Climate 
Action Partnership, formed between ten major U.S. corporations and environmental 
groups to lobby for climate change legislation). 
7 EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE:  EU EMISSIONS 
TRADING-–AN OPEN SCHEME PROMOTING GLOBAL INNOVATION 6 (2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/emission_trading2_en.pdf; see also in-
fra Part IV.C.1. 
8 See infra Part IV.C.2 (identifying the Chicago Climate Exchange as a potential 
source of “‘pre-approved’ GHG emissions credits for U.S. tort defendants”). 
9 See David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea:  Tort-Based Climate 
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003); Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming 
as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293 (2005); Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin 
A. Krass, Global Warming As a Public Nuisance:  Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 
16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 407 (2005); Benjamin P. Harper, Note, Climate Change 
Litigation:  The Federal Common Law of Interstate Nuisance and Federalism Concerns, 40 GA. 
L. REV. 661 (2006); see also Global Warming Panel, Part II, The Role of State Attorneys 
General in National Environmental Policy, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 351, 352 (2005) (re-
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I.  A COMPARISON OF THE RELATIVE EFFICACY OF STATE POSITIVE 
REGULATION AND COMMON LAW LITIGATION IN PROMPTING A 
 FEDERAL REGULATORY RESPONSE 
A.  The State-Level Response to the Federal Climate Change Policy Gap 
For at least the past decade, states have been at the vanguard of 
policy and regulatory responses to climate change, filling a gap left by 
a lack of leadership on behalf of the federal government.10  The fed-
eral government has failed to take an aggressive stance on climate 
change mitigation; Congress has yet to enact a program for manda-
tory reductions and the Bush administration’s reliance upon voluntary 
emissions reductions and its targeted increase in GHG intensity11 is 
not expected to reduce such intensity beyond that achieved by usual 
business trends alone.12  Although, as a result of the Court’s ruling in 
marks of Professor Thomas Merrill, providing a laundry list of all of the knotty legal 
issues raised by a public nuisance global warming lawsuit). 
10 For excellent overviews of the climate change policies of all fifty states and many 
local governments, see Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, What’s Being Done in the 
States, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/ (last visited 
May 1, 2007) and United States Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change, 
State and Local Governments, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/wycd/ 
stateandlocalgov/index.html (last visited May 1, 2007). 
11 See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet:  President 
Bush Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives (Feb. 14, 2002), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020214.html (unveiling “a 
bold new strategy for addressing global climate change”).  For information on the 
commitment of seven northeastern states to create a regional cap-and-trade program 
applicable to the electric power sector starting in 2009, see Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative [RGGI], http://www.rggi.org/index.htm (last visited May 1, 2007).  For 
scholarly treatments of the growing phenomenon of state and local action on climate 
change, see, for example, BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE:  THE 
EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 18-21 (2004) (identifying 
distinct periods in the evolution of state and local environmental initiatives); John 
Dernbach, Moving the Climate Change Debate from Models to Proposed Legislation:  Lessons 
from State Experience, [2000] 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,933, 10,949-72 (Nov. 
2000) (suggesting legislative solutions based on the successes and failures of legislative 
attempts on the state level); Engel & Saleska, supra note 3, at 209-22 (analyzing ob-
served patterns of subglobal action in light of behavior predicted by modeling); Laura 
Kosloff & Mark Trexler, State Climate Change Initiatives:  Think Locally, Act Globally, NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2004, at 46, 47-50 (describing and analyzing the role 
played by state and local environmental initiatives) and Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Labo-
ratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems:  State, Local and Private Leadership in Develop-
ing Strategies To Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 15, 26-31 (2004) (attributing the development of state action to the federal gov-
ernment’s inability to act). 
12 The Bush administration’s goal is to reduce the overall GHG intensity (metric 
tons of GHGs emitted per million dollars in gross domestic output) by 18% over the 
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Massachusetts v. EPA,13 the EPA is now under court order to consider 
regulating vehicle GHG emissions under the Federal Clean Air Act, it 
is probably unlikely that federal action compelled by litigation will 
produce aggressive action, at least any time soon.  Nevertheless, state 
climate regulation is piecemeal, of varying levels of stringency, and 
thus far has not added up to a whole lot of aggregate emissions reduc-
tions.14  Thus state and local climate change mitigation poses a thresh-
old question that needs to be addressed prior to considering the spe-
cial situation of common law litigation:  does it make any sense for 
subglobal actors to address a global environmental problem, espe-
cially one that results from the degradation of a global commons such 
as the earth’s climate system? 
Unquestionably, a global environmental problem warrants an in-
ternational response.15  Climate change is the result of a global trag-
decade between 2002 and 2012.  However, the GHG intensity of the economy dropped 
by about the same amount, 17.4%, over the decade between 1990 and 2000.  Thus if 
the next decade reflects the same trend toward greater efficiency in the use of fossil 
fuels as the previous decade, the economy will achieve the Bush administration goal 
without the need for any additional incentives or regulatory requirements.  See John 
Holdren, Dir., Program on Sci., Tech., & Pub. Policy, Harvard Univ., Presentation at 
The Ohio State University:  The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change:  Does 
the Bush Administration Think It Can Fool Mother Nature? 56-59 (Oct. 7, 2004) (on 
file with author). 
13 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462-63 (2007) (holding that the Federal Clean Air Act author-
izes the EPA to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles and hence the EPA Ad-
ministrator must apply her “judgment” to determine whether regulation is warranted 
because such emissions, in the words of section 202(a)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
7521(a)(1) (2000), “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-
fare”). 
14 There has been no definitive estimate of the total quantity of GHG emissions 
reduced through the various state and local programs and initiatives, perhaps because 
it is such a fast-moving statistic.  However, the author and another researcher have es-
timated that the adoption, by ten states, of the California GHG vehicle emissions stan-
dards in addition to the renewable portfolio standards in effect in twenty-one or so 
states still only reduces total U.S. GHG emissions by between 1% and 1.5% “in the 
2015-20 timeframe.”  Engel & Saleska, supra note 3, at 212-13.  This falls far short of the 
2.7% to 3.4% reduction called for by economists that estimate the optimal amount of 
emissions reductions for the United States acting unilaterally.  Id. at 207 tbl.3, 213 
(comparing the expected reduction due to state and local action with those predicted 
efficient by William Nordhaus and Zili Yang in their Regional Dynamic General-
Equilibrium (RICE) model). 
15 For proponents of the need for an international, as opposed to a unilateral, re-
sponse to climate change, see Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1554-55 (1999) (“[T]o be structurally sound and to deliver effi-
cient (and fair) results, the regulatory calculus must include all of the potential cost 
bearers and beneficiaries of governmental intervention (or nonintervention).”) and 
Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change:  How Can National Governments 
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edy of the commons; it is the combined result of GHG emissions from 
billions of sources around the world which, in total, exceed the earth’s 
natural carrying capacity.16  As with common-pool environmental re-
sources smaller than the troposphere, achieving reductions in the ex-
ploitative activity by way of a cooperative solution among the largest 
users is more efficient than relying upon independent adoption of 
unilateral reductions by a fraction of such users.17
That said, the emphasis on an internationally negotiated solution 
may still be overstated.  Depending upon the size of the nation’s emis-
sions, unilateral reductions may, in fact, be economically rational even 
if less efficient than reductions made pursuant to an international co-
operative agreement.18  More importantly for present purposes, action 
at the subglobal level may constitute an initial step toward regulation 
at a higher jurisdictional level, even eventually culminating in actions 
taken pursuant to an international agreement. 
Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 323 (“Because unilateral action 
will invariably be highly inefficient, any domestic program requires an effective inter-
national agreement, if not a set of international greenhouse policy instruments.”). 
16 See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 47 (7th ed. 2006) (identify-
ing climate change as the “most striking” commons problem); Richard B. Stewart, En-
vironmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2097-99 
(1993) (advocating international solutions to the international tragedy of the com-
mons); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult:  The Obstacles to Governing the Com-
mons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 253 (2000) (examining the unique and traditional aspects of 
global warming as a commons problem).  On an annual basis, all sources of GHGs in 
the world emit approximately 7.9 gigatons of GHGs.  Of this, approximately 4.6 giga-
tons are absorbed by the earth’s ecosystem—in the ocean, soils, forests, and other 
vegetative matter—while the 3.3 gigatons emitted in excess of the earth’s natural ab-
sorptive capacity is the source of anthropogenic-based climate change.  FERN, SINKS IN 
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL:  A DIRTY DEAL FOR FORESTS, FOREST PEOPLES AND THE CLIMATE 
7 fig.2 (2001). 
17 See Franz Hackl & Gerald J. Pruckner, How Global Is the Solution to Global Warm-
ing?, 20 ECON. MODELLING 93, 102-11 (2002) (comparing efficient GHG control rates 
under conditions of global cooperation and noncooperation); William D. Nordhaus & 
Zili Yang, A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change 
Strategies, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 741, 751-55 (1996) (same); Zili Yang, Dual-Rate Discounting 
in Dynamic Economic-Environmental Modeling, 20 ECON. MODELLING 941, 946-48 (2003) 
(same). 
18 See Engel & Saleska, supra note 3, at 207-08 (arguing that unilateral action to 
reduce domestic GHG emissions is economically rational for nations with large emis-
sions, even if it is not optimal in comparison to the reductions called for under a co-
operative international solution). 
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B.  The “Domino Effect” 
Regulation at the subglobal level may be an effective means of 
triggering regulation at a higher jurisdictional level.  This can occur as 
a result of interest group influence on the political process or through 
trade and globalization.  At the national level, Elliott, Ackerman, and 
Millian set forth the still-dominant theory that the imposition of 
widely disparate costs upon industry through inconsistent state regula-
tions will catalyze industry to seek preemptive federal regulation in an 
effort to reduce such costs or at least blunt their anticompetitive ef-
fect.19  Indeed, this theory seems to characterize accurately several in-
stances of industry support for federal environmental regulation.20
19 See E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of 
Statutory Evolution:  The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 
330-31 (1985) (attributing the automobile industry’s support for the Motor Vehicle Air 
Pollution Control Act of 1965 to a fear of “differing or inconsistent air pollution stan-
dards set at the state and local level” and “political domino effect[s] in which one state 
legislature after another would set more and more stringent emissions standards with-
out regard to the costs or technical difficulties involved”). 
20 Two examples are the industry-supported campaigns to include tailpipe emis-
sions standards under the Federal Clean Air Act of 1965, see S. REP. NO. 89-192, at 5-6 
(1965) (“[I]t would be more desirable to have national standards rather than for each 
state to have a variation in standards and requirements which could result in chaos in-
sofar as manufacturers, dealers, and users are concerned.”), and to establish nationally 
uniform energy efficiency standards for appliances under the National Appliance En-
ergy Conservation Act of 1987, see S. REP. NO. 100-6, at 4 (1987) reprinted in 1987 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 52, 54-55 (“[A] system of separate State appliance standards has begun to 
emerge and the trend is growing.  Because of this trend, appliance manufacturers were 
confronted with the problem of a growing patchwork of differing state regulations 
which would increasingly complicate their design, production and marketing plans.”).  
See also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 31-32 
(1981) (describing the eastern U.S. coal industry’s surprising support for Section III of 
the proposed amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1977, and quoting language in the 
1976 House Committee report revealing that the motive behind the industry’s support 
was a desire to equalize the playing field between states with “cheaper low-sulfur coal,” 
and states with “predominately higher sulfur coals”).  Freeman and DeShazo have 
delved deeper than Elliott et al., in an effort to better understand how interest group 
dynamics at the state level can shape the nature of the ultimate federal regulatory re-
sponse.  J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation:  The Case 
of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (2007).  They posit that federal regulation is 
most likely to contain ceilings preempting more stringent state standards, where het-
erogeneous state regulation threatens to impose cost heterogeneity upon industries 
that produce national, or at least regional, products.  Id. at 1515-16  They predict, on 
the other hand, that federal statutes will contain minimum standards where state regu-
lation has been lacking or weak.  Id. at 1503-04.   
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There is little reason to doubt that the same dynamic can and 
does take place on the international level.21  Several examples illus-
trate this dynamic.  One is the development of the environmental 
management systems of ISO 14000.  There are many drivers behind 
the ISO 14000 standard, but one of them appears to be a quest by 
multinational businesses for uniform environmental standards as an 
alternative to the more costly process of complying with disparate 
standards of the United States and other industrialized nations.22  A 
second example is the 1989 Montreal Protocol phasing out ozone-
depleting chemicals.  Ratification of the Protocol was given a signifi-
cant boost when U.S. industry supported the treaty after it became 
clear that the United States was intent upon adopting stringent do-
mestic regulation of chlorofluorocarbons.23  International climate 
change treaties comprise a third example.24
Elliott et al.’s industry lobbying theory may be the leading interest 
group theory explaining how local regulation might trigger regulatory 
action at higher levels of government, but it is not the only one.  A 
competing theory is suggested by the traditional “states as laboratories 
of democracy” idea suggested by Justice Brandeis.25  According to this 
theory, federal policymakers will propose national legislation once a 
21 See ELIZABETH R. DESOMBRE, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY:  INDUSTRY, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, AND U.S. POWER 9-10 (2000) (“When 
U.S. industry has higher production costs than its international competitors due to 
regulation, or when some industry has developed a substitute for regulated substances, 
either type of industry will gain from international adoption of the domestic regula-
tions.”); Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue:  Legal Transplants 
and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295, 1308 (2001) (de-
tailing the “conscious legal borrowing” from national law by the drafters of interna-
tional climate change treaties). 
22 See Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management Stan-
dards Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation?, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 237, 253-54 
(2000) (“[A] major impetus for the ISO 14000 standards is the need for harmonization 
among various environmental management and auditing programs. . . . These pro-
grams, using varying standards and processes, increase costs and make compliance dif-
ficult for companies operating in more than one country.”). 
23 RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 31 (1991) (“The strength of 
public concern confronted American Industry with the threat of a patchwork of vary-
ing state regulations. . . . U.S. industry not only became resigned to controls but even 
publicly favored federal regulations, which would at least be uniform and therefore 
less disruptive.”). 
24 See Wiener, supra note 21, at 1339-40. 
25 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
  
1572 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1563 
 
promising policy approach emerges after a period of state experimen-
tation.  Still another theory, a variant of Elliott et al.’s interest group 
theory and the Brandeisian idea, is that federal lawmakers might in-
tervene to enact a promising state or regional regulatory approach 
that is more efficiently implemented on a national scale.  An example 
of this might be regulation through a tradable permit program.  Im-
plemented nationwide, as opposed to on the state or regional level, 
the participants in a marketable trading program reap the benefits of 
more trading partners and hence a more efficient market.  Thus, in-
dustries covered by a state or regional trading program might seek 
federal legislation to expand the trading market to cover similar 
sources nationwide.26
C.  State Public Nuisance Litigation as a Subglobal “Domino” 
Tort litigation, like positive regulation, can be as effective a means 
of imposing varying costs upon industry as state-by-state regulation 
and hence is capable of triggering exactly the same industry re-
sponse.27  Indeed, there is evidence that the two public nuisance cli-
mate change cases may already be having this effect; defendants in 
one suit have called publicly for federal global warming regulation,28 
and Congress is now considering ways to use the liability threat to help 
26 For example, one might expect that electric utility companies, soon subject to 
the GHG cap-and-trade program of the northeastern states under the RGGI, may seek 
the enactment of a federal cap-and-trade program to broaden the scope of the pro-
gram and thus increase the number of potential trading partners from which to buy 
and sell excess emissions credits. 
27 Moreover, it is not clear that industry must lose in the litigation, or lose unani-
mously, for litigation to spur industry interest in a federal regulatory solution.  None of 
the lawsuits filed against the gun industry for liability related to crimes committed with 
guns were successful, and yet the industry was able to obtain a broad liability exemp-
tion from Congress.  See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-
92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 
922, 924) (exempting firearms dealers and manufacturers from liability for crimes 
committed with the use of their products).  This example may also indicate that al-
though litigation success is not necessary to spur industry to seek federal regulation, it 
may influence the stringency of the regulatory result obtained from Congress. 
28 Subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit, one of the utility company defendants in 
the public nuisance lawsuit filed by Connecticut and other northeastern states an-
nounced its support of mandatory emissions reductions.  See Jeffrey Ball & Antonio Re-
galado, Cinergy Backs U.S. Emissions Cap, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2004, at A6 (“Cinergy 
Corp., one of the nation’s biggest electric utilities, endorsed the idea of a national cap 
on global-warming emissions and . . . . believes . . . that Congress should [regulate] to 
‘take the unnecessary uncertainty out of national environmental policy.’”). 
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support a mandatory emissions reduction program.29  The cost-
imposing nature of litigation is especially true of nuisance law, which 
is notoriously ill defined and whose elements and remedy differ sig-
nificantly from state to state.30  The uncertainty in the legal doctrine 
will elevate costs while the differences between states will cause costs 
to vary, perhaps significantly. 
As others have noted,31 there is no overlap between the state plain-
tiffs and power plants run by defendant companies named in the 
state-initiated public nuisance lawsuits.  The fact that the defendants 
are out of state both explains the lawsuits, and I will argue, makes it 
even more likely that the lawsuits could prompt federal regulation.  By 
suing large out of state companies, the state plaintiffs may be attempt-
ing to counteract the anticompetitive effects of their own positive 
regulation of in-state sources of GHGs.  In essence, the public nui-
sance lawsuits against out-of-state companies, companies that are be-
yond the reach of its positive law, might be considered an extension of 
the state’s strategy to reduce in-state emissions.  For example, all of 
the state plaintiffs in the public nuisance suit against midwestern and 
southern electric power generators have committed to reducing 
29 Litigation against industrial contributors to global warming opens up the possi-
bility of a quid pro quo:  industry accepts federal mandatory emissions limits in ex-
change for immunity from liability for past contributions to climate change.  Such an 
exchange is apparently under discussion on Capitol Hill.  Doug Obey, Backers of CO2 
Curbs Eye Liability Relief to Bolster Industry Support, INSIDEEPA, Sept. 8, 2006 (“Capitol 
Hill supporters of legislation to regulate carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are quietly 
considering whether to provide industry liability protection from global warming-
related lawsuits, in an effort to win backing for mandatory GHG limits, according to 
Capitol Hill and other sources.”). 
30 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 86 at 616-17 (“There is general 
agreement that [nuisance] is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition.  Few 
terms have afforded so excellent an illustration of the familiar tendency of the courts 
to seize upon a catchword as a substitute for any analysis of a problem . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)).  But see DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 462 at 1320-21 (2000) (con-
tending that, although nuisance was once the “jungle Prosser described,” separately 
analyzing private nuisance from public and statutory nuisance cases “make[s] possible 
a reasonably coherent understanding of private nuisance”).  While public nuisance 
may be less muddled than private nuisance to begin with, the plaintiffs in the two cases 
under consideration here have magnified the uncertainty by suing in the alternative, 
under either the state law of public nuisance or federal common law of nuisance.  See, 
e.g., Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-2 (describing a public nuisance tort action taken by 
eight states against several companies under federal and state law, and listing the Plain-
tiff states as Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, and Wisconsin and the Defendants as corporations incorporated in New York, 
Delaware, and Minnesota).
31 See Harper, supra note 9, at 689-90. 
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GHGs from their own in-state utilities and several are well along the 
way to implementing such reductions.32  Unless their GHG emissions 
are similarly controlled, cheaper electricity generated by the defen-
dant out-of-state utility companies might replace the electricity pro-
vided by the plaintiff states’ in-state electric power generating compa-
nies.  Thus one motivation for the lawsuit could be an effort to “level 
the competitive playing field” between in-state and out-of-state utilities 
through the application of similar emissions standards.  California, 
however, has not only committed to large in-state GHG reductions 
across its economy, it has also promulgated carbon dioxide limits for 
motor vehicles sold in the state.33  Implementation of these regula-
tions has been delayed, however, by the EPA’s failure to grant Califor-
nia the waiver of preemption required by the Federal Clean Air Act,34 
32 See Memorandum of Understanding, Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative 1 (Dec. 
20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_brief_12_20_05.pdf (providing 
that Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Vermont are all participating members of 
the RGGI).  In December 2005, the RGGI states committed to implementing the first 
regional cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide emissions from electric utilities 
located in participating states.  Beginning in 2009, the RGGI will stabilize carbon diox-
ide emissions from power plants in the region at current levels through 2015, and re-
duce emissions by 10% from current levels by 2019.  Id. at 2-3; Seven Northeast States 
Launch Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, ENV’T NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 20, 2005, 
http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/dec2005/2005-12-20-05.asp.  California, also a 
party to the utility public nuisance suit, is perhaps the national leader in terms of do-
mestic regulation of GHGs.  On September 27, 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger signed 
AB No. 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act, which caps California’s GHG emissions 
at 1990 levels by 2020.  See California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 2007); California Global Warming Act, 
Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/ 
in_the_states/ab32/index.cfm (last visited May 1, 2007) (summarizing the goals and 
methods of the act).  The Act requires that electric utilities comply with mandatory 
GHG emissions reporting.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38530.  According to one 
source, “[t]his means the state’s investor-owned utilities, municipal utilities and load-
serving entities can expect to be some of the first entities required to report and re-
duce GHG emissions.”  The California Climate Action Registry and AB 32:  Frequently 
Asked Questions 1-2, http://www.climateregistry.org/docs/ABOUTUS/AB_32_FAQs_ 
101006.pdf (last visited May 1, 2007).  Wisconsin and Iowa both have climate change 
action plans that discuss the advisability of reducing emissions from the in-state electric 
utility sector.  For instance, Wisconsin’s plan focuses on reducing carbon dioxide from 
the electric utility sector, concluding that the state could significantly reduce GHG 
emissions from that sector at little or no cost.  Wisconsin Climate Action Plan 20-21, 
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/aw/air/global/WICCAP.pdf (last visited May 1, 2007).  The 
Iowa plan proposes a program for reporting and reducing GHGs from the state’s elec-
tric utility sector.  RICHARD A. NEY ET AL., UNIV. OF IOWA, IOWA GREENHOUSE GAS AC-
TION PLAN 59-64 (1996), available at http://atmos.cgrer.uiowa.edu/research/reports/ 
iggap/FinalReport.pdf. 
33 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.1 (2005). 
34 Clean Air Act § 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2000). 
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and by a legal challenge by the automobile industry.35  Thus, Califor-
nia’s public nuisance lawsuit against major automobile manufacturers, 
in which the State is seeking damages, may be an effort to demon-
strate the very real costs of climate change to a coastal state, such as 
California, and hence further justify its unilateral approach to motor 
vehicle GHG emissions.36  Suing out-of-state businesses might also be 
considered a second-best strategy for achieving nationwide regulation 
of GHGs; each of the state plaintiffs in the public nuisance lawsuits, 
other than Iowa and Wisconsin, was also a plaintiff in the litigation 
against the EPA for failure to promulgate national GHG emissions 
standards for motor vehicles.37
The very fact that state common law climate change lawsuits target 
out-of-state defendants may enhance the probability that these suits 
will prompt a federal regulatory response.  By virtue of being located 
out of state, the defendant industries are unlikely to have a reserve of 
goodwill within the hallways of the plaintiff’s state office buildings that 
might help in extricating themselves from the litigation.  As a result, 
they may be more likely to seek relief from federal authorities.  In 
turn, federal authorities may lend a more sympathetic ear to the pleas 
of industry that it is the subject of a nuisance enforcement suit filed by 
an allegedly overreaching neighboring state.38
35 California’s regulations are currently being challenged by the automobile in-
dustry, which alleges that the standards are preempted by the federal Energy Policy 
and Conservation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2000).  Central Valley Chrysler Jeep, Inc. 
v. Witherspoon, No. CV F 04-6663 AWI LJO, 2007 WL 135688, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 
2007).  Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Transportation has attempted to effectu-
ate this preemption by administrative rule.  See Average Fuel Economy Standards for 
Light Trucks Model Years 2008–2011, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,566, 17,654 (Apr. 6, 2006) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, 537). 
36 For example, California is ineligible for the needed waiver of federal preemp-
tion under the Clean Air Act, should the EPA find that California “does not need such 
state standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions.”  Clean Air Act § 
209(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(B) (2000).  In justifying its claim for damages, 
California bolsters its argument that its regulation of vehicle GHG emissions is needed 
to meet the extraordinary threats posed by global warming to its environment, threats 
that include not only loss of its magnificent coastal resources, but also loss of its supply 
of water through reduced snowmelt. 
37 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1438 (2007). 
38 Cf. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), 1342(d)(2)(A) (providing a process, under the Fed-
eral Clean Water Act, for an affected state to complain to the permitting state and to 
the EPA about a source of pollution in the permitting state and authorizing the EPA to 
bar the grant of a permit based upon an affected state’s complaint); 42 U.S.C. § 7426 
(requiring, under the federal Clean Air Act, that states require that major sources of 
air pollution within that state notify certain states affected by the pollution and author-
izing the EPA to require that such sources reduce their emissions).  
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Not only may state-initiated public nuisance litigation against out-
of-state industries be effective in triggering a federal regulatory pro-
gram, the viability of such suits is likely limited to the time period 
prior to federal enactment of such a program.  Thus, there is little ba-
sis for fearing that state public nuisance lawsuits constitute a perma-
nent enlargement of a state’s regulatory apparatus; Supreme Court 
precedents ensure that such suits are unlikely to survive the develop-
ment of federal standards addressing the same activities that serve as 
the basis for the suits.  Under City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,39 claims un-
der the federal common law of nuisance by one state or local sover-
eign government against an out-of-state source of pollution would ap-
pear to be preempted once Congress enacts applicable federal 
legislation containing standards of conduct.40  Similarly, the Court has 
held that the nuisance law of all but the source state is preempted 
once Congress enacts standards applicable to the targeted conduct.41  
By basically eliminating the viability of such suits upon the enactment 
of a federal program, the Court ensures that state standards govern 
only during the time period that precedes congressional action.42
These precedents demonstrate that the state-initiated climate 
change lawsuits now being filed have a finite lifetime; they are only vi-
able until such time as Congress enacts an applicable program for re-
ducing GHGs.  As noted above, a recent decision by the Supreme 
Court establishes that GHG emissions are presently subject to federal 
regulation under the Clean Air Act.43  Nevertheless, state common law 
litigation is unlikely to be preempted until such time as the EPA actu-
39 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
40 Id. at 317 (concluding, with respect to water pollution, that Congress “has occu-
pied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program su-
pervised by an expert administrative agency”); see also United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 
532 F. Supp. 699, 702 (D.N.J. 1982) (finding the federal common law of nuisance as 
applied to air pollution disputes preempted by the federal Clean Air Act). 
41 Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987) (“The [Clean Water Act] 
precludes only those . . . standards . . . that are incompatible with those established by 
the procedures set forth in the Act. . . . [N]othing in the Act bars aggrieved individuals 
from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the laws of the source state.”). 
42 This is also consistent with the role of public nuisance as a “gap filler” in the 
field of environmental law.  See James R. Drabick, Note, “Private” Public Nuisance and 
Climate Change:  Working Within, and Around, the Special Injury Rule, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L. REV. 503, 519 (2005). 
43 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459-60 (2007). 
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ally promulgates GHG emissions standards applicable to the conduct 
that is the subject of the lawsuits.44
In sum, litigation, and especially litigation against out-of-state in-
dustries, may be an effective means by which states catalyze the en-
actment of a federal regulatory program.  However, until such time as 
a federal regulatory program comes into existence, the regulatory im-
pact of such state litigation may serve in the place of a federal pro-
gram.  Supreme Court precedents ensure that federal standards will 
largely displace this ad hoc state scheme if and when it is enacted by 
Congress. 
D.  The Judicial Response to Subglobal “Domino” Litigation 
Regardless of whether state-level common law litigation is ulti-
mately successful in prompting federal climate change regulation, an 
important question remains:  what, if any, impact should the potential 
for such a federal regulatory program have in the meantime upon 
courts hearing such cases?  Certainly the potential for federal regula-
tion should not be used as an excuse for inaction by the courts; fed-
eral regulation may fail to materialize and, as argued above, adjudica-
tion of these claims may be the best route to prompting such 
regulation.45  Furthermore, such lawsuits are, by definition, gap-filling 
measures used by states to support positive state-level regulation of 
GHG emissions.46  Judicial deference to potential federal regulation 
prevents states from using their common law authority for such gap-
filling purposes. 
At the same time, it is reasonable for a court to be on the lookout 
for ways of crafting the relief requested in such lawsuits in a manner 
that is consistent with expected federal regulatory outcomes.  To the 
extent that public nuisance climate change litigation is a stopgap 
measure, consistency between judicial and eventual federal regulatory 
remedies will result in cost savings both to defendants and to society.  
By complying with a judicially imposed remedy consistent with a later-
promulgated federal regulatory program, the defendant is saved from 
44 But see Merrill, supra note 9, at 313, 316-17 (arguing that a claim under the fed-
eral common law of public nuisance against out-of-state industries for emitting GHGs 
may be preempted at the present time, despite the EPA’s silence on this matter, under 
the “field displacement” doctrine). 
45 But cf. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (dismissing states’ public nuisance climate change lawsuit on the grounds that it 
presented nonjudiciable political questions). 
46 See supra Part I.C. 
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expending additional resources to comply with such a program.  Soci-
ety benefits as well; information gained through the individual state-
initiated court cases will enable lawmakers to develop better-tailored 
and more successful regulatory programs, substantially reducing the 
costs of the eventual federal regulatory program. 
With respect to public nuisance climate change litigation, I argue 
that these considerations support judicial remedies that allow defen-
dants to comply with any judicially imposed GHG abatement order 
with GHG emissions credits.47  As discussed below, if and when a fed-
eral climate change regulatory program is enacted, it is almost sure to 
consist of a cap-and-trade program, whereby sources may use tradable 
emissions credits to comply with GHG emissions caps.48  Therefore, 
adoption of a judicial remedy that reflects the likely design of the fu-
ture regulatory solution reduces the costs of compliance for individual 
defendants.  This, in turn, reduces the potential unfairness involved in 
essentially requiring such defendants to comply with a future regula-
tory program prior to the program’s effective date and hence prior to 
the time when all other similar industries will be required to comply.  
Additionally, because industries not sued could be expected to reduce 
their GHG emissions in order to sell excess credits to defendants sub-
ject to a court-imposed abatement order,49 adoption of an emissions 
trading compliance option will have the further benefit of jump-
starting compliance with a future regulatory regime, even from com-
panies not subject to a court-imposed GHG abatement order. 
47 For a discussion of how such a proposal would work in practice, see infra notes 
51-52 and accompanying text. 
48 See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing the options lawmakers 
have when designing an environmental regulatory program). 
49 This is a basic tenet of open market emissions trading, which is the original 
emissions trading approach employed by the EPA under the Clean Air Act.  See RICH-
ARD A. LIROFF, AIR POLLUTION OFFSETS:  TRADING, SELLING AND BANKING 23-26 (1980) 
(describing current trading policies in air pollution nonattainment areas, according to 
which industries can construct new or modified major sources of pollution if they can 
offset the additional emissions with emissions reduction credits generated through the 
reduction in discharges at existing sources); see also Susan Wood, Offset Credits:  The 
Growth of a Market, ENVTL. FIN., Feb. 2000, at 18 (describing financial incentives to re-
duce emissions and thereby create sellable emissions reduction credits). 
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II.  USE OF EMISSIONS REDUCTION OFFSETS AS A  
COMMON LAW LIABILITY COMPLIANCE OPTION 
A.  The Mechanics of Net Emissions Accounting 
The usual remedy awarded in a public nuisance action is injunc-
tive relief in the form of a court order requiring the defendant to 
abate its contribution to the nuisance.50  Although some states have, 
by statute, permitted private plaintiffs to recover damages under a 
public nuisance theory, it is not unusual to find that the same states 
expressly limit the relief available when the state is the plaintiff in the 
abatement action.51
The basic idea advanced in this Article is that courts should en-
able defendants held liable for contributing to the public nuisance of 
global warming to use emissions offset credits, purchased or otherwise 
obtained from third parties, to comply with a court order.  Third par-
ties might generate such credits through permanent reductions in 
their GHG emissions or through carbon sequestration projects.  For 
example, suppose Utility A is required to reduce its emissions by a 
court order entered against it as a remedy in a successful lawsuit alleg-
ing that the GHG emissions emanating from its coal -f ired electric 
generating units are a public nuisance.  Suppose also that Utility A is 
locked into a long-term supply contract for the coal it burns and that 
the cost of breaking the contract is significant.  Suppose that, given 
this contract, Utility A could only reduce its own GHG emissions suffi-
ciently to comply with the court order by replacing its current plant 
with an Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) facility, an 
extremely expensive proposition.  Suppose finally that Utility B, which 
also owns coal-burning, electricity-generating plants, but which is not 
locked into a long-term coal supply contract, could convert its plant to 
natural gas and, in so doing, reduce its GHG emissions in an amount 
comparable to the reductions required of Utility A.  Utility B would be 
willing to do so, however, only if it could sell to Utility A the emissions 
reductions, or credits, generated by such a conversion and if its asking 
50 DOBBS, supra note 30, § 468 at 1338 (“On the ground that the damages remedy 
is inadequate to protect rights in property, courts often issue injunctions compelling 
the defendant to abate private as well as public nuisances.”). 
51 See People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Am. Art Enters., 656 P.2d 1170, 1173 n.11 
(1983) (“[A]lthough California’s general nuisance statute expressly permits the recov-
ery of damages in a public nuisance action brought by a specially injured party, it does 
not grant a damage remedy in actions brought on behalf of the People to abate a pub-
lic nuisance.”).
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price is significantly less than the costs to Utility A of replacing its 
generating units with IGCC technology.  By allowing Utility A to com-
ply with the court order by purchasing GHG emissions credits from 
Utility B, the same amount of emissions are reduced, but at less cost 
than if Utility A were required to achieve such reductions at its own 
facility. 
Despite the widespread acceptance of the use of emissions trading 
to meet emissions reductions dictated by regulation, it has yet to be 
incorporated into judicially fashioned relief in a common law liability 
action.  This, and the corresponding lack of scholarship suggesting 
the idea, might be explained by a variety of factors—the difficulty of 
establishing the liability of one of many contributors to an air pollu-
tion problem for which an emissions trading program might be suit-
able; 52 the fact that many nonlocalized pollution problems are today 
addressed by federal environmental statutes that have largely sup-
planted common law remedies; 53 and the seeming futility of suggest-
ing a remedy requiring, as a result of the need for third-party emis-
sions credits, the participation of nonparties.54
Nevertheless, the special characteristics of public nuisance climate 
change litigation may present an appropriate constellation of facts 
and circumstances to justify dispensing with any potential judicial re-
luctance.  First, as will be explained below, plaintiffs suing in public 
nuisance over a defendant’s contribution to global warming may have 
a less onerous causation burden than that confronting a plaintiff su-
52 See, e.g., Ellen Friedland, Note, Pollution Share Liability:  A New Remedy for Plaintiffs 
Injured by Air Pollutants, 9 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 297, 314-19 (1984) (exploring the diffi-
culty of finding a polluter liable when such factors as time, geography, and topography 
complicate the plaintiff’s ability to trace her injury to the polluter); Patrick J. Scully, 
Comment, Proof of Causation in a Private Action for Acid Rain Damage, 36 ME. L. REV. 117, 
117 (1984) (“It is impossible to trace individual episodes of acid rain to the particular 
emissions sources causing the problem or to apportion acid rain injuries among con-
tributing polluters.”). 
53 Most federal environmental laws contain a savings clause preserving common 
law remedies.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (2000) (“Nothing in this section shall re-
strict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or 
common law to seek enforcement of any standard or requirement . . . or to seek any 
other relief . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Nevertheless, this has not prevented the courts 
from finding that federal environmental laws preempt state common law remedies for 
pollution discharges.  See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (noting specifically 
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981), and Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 
479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987)). 
54 Tradable Emissions:  Hearing Before the J. Economic Comm., 105th Cong. 113 (1997) 
(statement of Daniel J. Dudek, Senior Economist, Environmental Defense Fund) (“An 
insufficient number of participants will doom an emissions trading market.”).
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ing for damages associated with a more localized pollutant such as sul-
fur dioxide.  Second, by now, regulators and industry (though admit-
tedly not courts) have more experience with emissions trading and 
the concept is now less foreign in the pollution context.55  Third, as 
will also be discussed further below,56 other nations’ GHG emissions 
trading programs, as well as voluntary programs within the United 
States, provide ready sources of GHG emissions credits that defen-
dants might use for compliance. 
The basic rationale behind the use of tradable emissions credits 
for compliance purposes in litigation is the same as that advanced for 
using emissions trading as a compliance mechanism in regulatory 
proposals for climate change mitigation—the fungibility of the source 
and location of emission reductions for the mitigation of global warm-
ing.  Like trades in emissions of chlorofluorocarbons, trades in emis-
sions of carbon dioxide and other GHGs do not give rise to spatial 
concerns due to the fact that such gases fully mix in the upper atmos-
phere and thus, unlike many other pollutants, are incapable of caus-
ing pollution “hot spots.” 57  Furthermore, the harm from GHG emis-
sions flows from the buildup of gases in the upper atmosphere, which 
causes changes to the earth’s climatic system, as opposed to a harm 
resulting from direct exposure to carbon dioxide or any other GHG.  
These characteristics mean that, for purposes of mitigating the effects 
of climate change, which source reduces its emissions of GHGs is en-
tirely irrelevant. 
The fungibility of GHG emissions with respect to their contribution 
to climate change has a twofold significance when it comes to tort liabil-
ity.  On the one hand, it opens up new options for common law reme-
dies, namely the defendant’s optional use of third-party emissions off-
sets.  On the other hand, it alleviates the plaintiff’s burden in 
establishing liability in the first place.  Because of the importance of the 
latter in even reaching the former, the implications of the fungibility of 
GHG emissions for the plaintiff’s ability to establish causation and the 
unreasonableness of the defendant’s conduct are discussed below. 
55 In the United States, this is primarily due to the acid rain emissions trading pro-
gram applicable to electric utilities under the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.  
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651b–7651c (regulating the trading of allowances for sulfur dioxide 
emissions). 
56 See infra Part IV.C (explaining GHG emissions trading regimes in the EU and 
U.S. private markets). 
57 James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental 
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 627 (2000). 
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B.  Fungibility as a Basic Requirement of Successful Trading Programs 
Tradable permit programs, such as emissions trading, are being 
used more and more often by regulators as a means of complying with 
regulatory caps upon the total, or aggregate, level at which a common 
resource may be exploited by multiple users.58  The resource subject 
to a tradable permit program could be the atmosphere, fisheries, 
groundwater, wetlands, or a myriad of other natural systems capable 
of being exploited by an unlimited number of users.  The individual 
exploitative acts could be taking something out of the commons—
fish, for instance—or putting something into the commons, such as 
acid-rain-forming sulfur dioxide or global-warming-inducing carbon 
dioxide. 
In designing any environmental regulatory program, regulators 
must determine the total amount by which the exploitative activity 
must be curtailed so as to prevent overexploitation of the resource at 
issue.  In so doing, however, regulators confront a critical choice:  
should they require that each individual user alter its behavior by re-
ducing its impact upon the resource, or should they permit a given 
user to pay other exploiters to reduce their impact instead? 
The choice between these two options depends upon whether the 
peculiar characteristics of the commons user (its “identity”) are rele-
vant to the chosen means of addressing the overexploitation problem.  
If the peculiar characteristics of the user are unimportant, all that 
matters being the extent to which the exploitative activity is reduced, 
the regulator should prefer that the commons user have the option of 
purchasing reductions from third parties, as this will be the more cost-
effective choice.59
Controversies that have arisen in the past with respect to the ap-
propriateness of allowing compliance through the use of tradable off-
sets have centered on whether the peculiar characteristics of regulated 
parties are important to which entities reduce their exploitative behav-
ior.  For instance, controversy over the Clean Air Act “bubble” pro-
gram largely focused on whether the identity of the source should 
matter to which sources reduce their emissions so as to meet the am-
bient air quality standards established by the Act.60  The EPA allowed 
58 Id. at 609-10. 
59 Scholars have demonstrated that the “fungibility” criterion just described is ac-
tually a multifactored analysis, encompassing questions of the fungibility of space, type, 
and time.  See id. at 622-30. 
60 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.1–.14 (2006) (establishing the ambient air quality standards). 
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sources to comply with state ambient air caps through the use of off-
setting emissions reductions achieved at the same plant but at differ-
ent emission points, or smokestacks.  Critics argued that the bubble 
approach retarded a source’s adoption of emissions-reducing tech-
nology, one of Congress’s primary objectives.61  Similarly, critics of the 
EPA’s policy permitting wetlands mitigation banking argue that wet-
lands acreage is not fungible and hence the obligation to preserve it 
cannot be traded among parties, since preserving wetlands in their 
original location also preserves all of the ecosystem services that go 
with the wetland—wildlife habitat, water purification, and flood con-
trol.62  The EPA’s rule allowing states to opt into a nationwide pro-
gram allowing electric utilities to trade mercury emissions credits 
touched off a still ongoing storm of criticism based on the argument 
that, because mercury is a relatively heavy pollutant, such a program 
will create areas of high mercury concentration, or “hotspots.” 63
Whether the emissions trading concept can be transferred to 
court-ordered injunctive relief for climate change depends in large 
part upon whether the peculiar characteristics of the source of GHG 
emissions that has been sued should figure into how that same source 
complies with a court order requiring a reduction or elimination of its 
emissions.  The nearly universal incorporation of emissions trading 
into compliance schemes for GHG reductions reflects a general con-
sensus among policymakers that the peculiar characteristics of a 
source of GHG emissions should not matter—that GHG emissions re-
ductions are truly fungible.64  Indeed, there are few areas of environ-
61 See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840-42 
(1984) (interpreting the statutory phrase “stationary source”); see also Jody Freeman, 
The Story of Chevron:  Environmental Law and Administrative Discretion, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW STORIES 171, 178-84 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005) 
(tracing the history of the debate). 
62 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 57, at 611-12. 
63 See JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM 
ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS:  AN ANALYSIS OF EPA’S CAP-AND-TRADE REGULATIONS 14-16 
(2006), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06feb/RL32868.pdf 
(discussing evidence of mercury hot spots and the EPA’s response). 
64 Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries can meet their obligations to 
reduce GHGs through a series of different types of emissions trading programs.  Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 17, 
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (authorizing emissions trad-
ing between signatory countries to meet their emissions reduction targets); id. art. 6 
(authorizing joint implementation); id. art. 12 (authorizing the clean development 
mechanism).  Similarly, emissions trading is a standard feature of the leading propos-
als for climate change legislation in the United States.  See Climate Stewardship and 
Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151 §§ 301–372, 109th Cong. (2005) (reintroducing a trad-
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mental law in which policymakers are in greater agreement than the 
fungibility of GHG emissions. 
Admittedly, there is room to challenge this conclusion.  As with 
emissions trading of conventional pollutants under the Clean Air Act, 
the widespread adoption of energy efficiency technology could be 
seen as an important means of addressing climate change.  By afford-
ing defendants the option to offset their emissions with credits, emis-
sions trading arguably retards the pace of technological change oth-
erwise prompted by a judicial abatement order.  Similarly, the 
conclusion that GHG emissions are fungible downplays individual re-
sponsibility for emissions, a factor that might be important to com-
mon law courts steeped in liability questions that frequently turn on 
issues of moral responsibility and corrective justice.65  Nevertheless, 
due to its cost advantages to the United States,66 the weight of opinion 
seems to favor emissions trading with respect to GHG emissions.67
C.  Causation 
While there may be many reasons to provide defendants with the 
flexibility to comply with an emissions abatement order through the 
use of third-party emissions offsets, the issue is moot if liability—and 
hence injunctive relief—is unlikely to be imposed by a court.  Al-
though, as noted previously, this Article does not attempt to analyze 
able allowances bill); Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th Cong §§ 311–372 
(2003) (making the original call for a tradable allowance in GHGs).  As discussed pre-
viously, the proposed regional program for controlling GHG emissions from electric 
utilities in the northeast includes an emissions trading program.  See RGGI, supra note 
11.
65 See generally Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 
421 (1982) (proposing corrective justice as a foundation of tort law); Jules L. Coleman, 
Moral Theories of Torts:  Their Scope and Limits (pts. 1 & 2), 1 LAW & PHIL. 371 (1982), 2 
LAW & PHIL. 5 (1983) (arguing that no one theory of morality explains all of tort law 
and exploring different theories rooting it in corrective justice principles); Ernest 
Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 MCGILL L.J. 403 (1989) (rejecting instru-
mental and economic theories of tort law in favor of a morality-based corrective justice 
theory). 
66 See LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE:  LOWER-
ING COST ESTIMATES THROUGH EMISSIONS TRADING—SOME DYNAMICS AND PITFALLS 1 
(1999), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/climate/clim-21.cfm 
(“[Most analyses] strongly suggest that emission trading would significantly reduce the 
projected costs of U.S. compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.”). 
67 See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Chart of Climate Legislation, http:// 
www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Cap%2Dand%2Dtrade%20bills%20110th%5FFeb5%2Epdf 
(last visited May 1, 2007) (listing five major GHG cap-and-trade bills proposed by the 
Senate in the 110th Congress). 
  
2007] HARMONIZING APPROACHES TO CLIMATE CHANGE 1585 
 
all elements of a plaintiff’s public nuisance claim for contribution to 
climate change, it will discuss the implications of the fungibility of 
GHG emissions for the plaintiff’s burden of establishing causation. 
A commonly cited barrier to public nuisance global warming law-
suits is the difficulty of establishing legal causation—proving that a 
particular source of GHG emissions should be held legally responsible 
for contributing to climate change.68  Among the problems noted is 
the difficulty of linking anthropogenic GHG emissions to any particu-
lar damaging weather event, such as a flood or a hurricane, and the 
further problem of linking any defendant’s emissions to a particular 
weather event.69  The complexity of the problem is somewhat ex-
plained by the fact that the causation issue here is actually multi-
tiered—the plaintiff must first establish that anthropogenic GHG 
emissions (as opposed to natural climate variability) are responsible 
for some amount of climate-related damages, and then that the emis-
sions of a particular defendant, which may be infinitesimal in relation 
to the sum total of anthropogenic emissions, legally “caused” some 
fraction of this ongoing harm.  Furthermore, although formally dis-
tinct from the issue of causation, there is the related question of the 
amount by which an individual defendant should be required to abate 
its emissions, assuming it is found otherwise liable for contributing to 
the public nuisance of climate change. 
As in many other areas of life, the answer to the causation conun-
drum depends upon the question asked.  This is particularly true with 
respect to the nuisance cause of action, since, to a significant extent, a 
plaintiff’s choice to pursue a public nuisance action for injunctive re-
lief, as opposed to a private nuisance action for damages, will signifi-
cantly mitigate the potential onerousness of the causation require-
ment.  This is because a public nuisance is, by definition, a harm to a 
community as opposed to a harm to any specific individuals.  It is also 
68 See Harper, supra note 9, at 684 (“The central problems are the diffuse nature of 
the sources of anthropogenic climate change, and the lack of clear connection be-
tween specific harms and specific sources.  These problems lead to difficulty in proving 
that a particular defendant’s actions were more likely than not the cause of the harm.” 
(footnote omitted)).  During the fall of 2006, the many intricacies of the causation is-
sue raised by the public nuisance global warming lawsuits were extensively debated by 
environmental law professors at U.S. law schools in an online forum.  See Postings to 
envlawprofessors@lists.uoregon.edu, California v. Auto Makers, (on file with author).
69 For an impressive effort to make precisely such links, see Myles R. Allen & Rich-
ard Lord, The Blame Game, 432 NATURE 551 (2004); Myles Allen, Liability for Climate 
Change:  Will It Ever Be Possible To Sue Anyone for Damaging the Climate?, 421 NATURE 891 
(2003). 
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because the typical relief in a public nuisance lawsuit is prospective 
abatement rather than damages.  Both of these characteristics have 
been held by courts to alleviate the necessity of establishing a specific 
tie between a particular defendant’s discharges and environmental 
harm that is consistent with having been caused by the defendant’s 
discharges.  In addition to explaining what public nuisance should re-
quire in terms of causation, I make the argument here that the logic 
behind the use of emissions offset reduction credits as a remedy sup-
ports the imposition of liability even in the absence of a particularized 
link between any one defendant’s GHG emissions and the plaintiff’s 
climate damages. 
Elemental to any tort case is the requirement that the plaintiff es-
tablish that the defendant’s conduct is a “but-for” cause of the alleged 
harm.  In the case of climate change, this might be broken down into 
two inquiries:  a threshold inquiry as to whether anthropogenic GHG 
emissions impose a risk of climate change, and a second inquiry into 
whether any one defendant’s emissions, such as a single utility sued by 
the northeastern states, or a single car manufacturer sued by Califor-
nia, is a “but-for” cause of climate changes.70
Due to advances in the scientific understanding of climate 
change, a plaintiff should not have trouble meeting the threshold re-
quirement.71  A scientific consensus now exists that it is likely, or even 
70 Especially in the area of toxic torts, courts have referred to these two inquiries 
as “general” and “specific” causation.  See M. STUART MADDEN & GERALD W. BOSTON, 
LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORTS 479 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing the “dual 
causation question”); see also Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th 
Cir. 1988) (distinguishing between general and specific causation in the mass tort class 
action context).  For example, a plaintiff alleging that her kidney cancer was caused by 
her exposure to the defendant’s carbon tetrachloride must establish that carbon tetra-
chloride is capable of causing kidney cancer under conditions similar to those charac-
terizing the plaintiff’s exposure.  See id. at 1203-04 (finding that the plaintiffs had insuf-
ficient medical proof that the injuries were caused by ingesting contaminated water).  
Specific causation, on the other hand, requires that the plaintiff meet a required stan-
dard of proof that her injuries were actually caused by the particular agent alleged.  In 
the toxic tort context, courts typically require the plaintiff establish that it is “more 
probable than not” that the agent alleged was actually responsible for her injuries.  See, 
e.g., Earl v. Cryovac, 772 P.2d 725, 727 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (“The trier of fact must 
be persuaded that the plaintiff’s claim of causation ‘is more probably true than not 
true.’” (quoting IDAHO CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.20.1 (2003), available at http:// 
www.isc.idaho.gov/rules/cv_ juryinst.pdf)). 
71 See Richard S.J. Tol & Roda Verheyen, State Responsibility and Compensation for 
Climate Change Damages—A Legal and Economic Assessment, 32 ENERGY POL’Y 1109, 1112 
(2004) (arguing that scientific facts with respect to climate change that have been 
demonstrated “will satisfy the requirements for general causation”). 
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very likely,72 that anthropogenic increases in GHGs are causing certain 
identifiable climatic changes.  Indeed, a consensus now exists that it is 
likely that most of the observed warming in global average tempera-
tures over the past fifty years is attributable to increases in anthropo-
genic emissions of GHGs.73  This rise is approximately 0.6ºC (1.1ºF) in 
global average surface temperatures,74 while the mean ocean tempera-
ture has risen by 0.05ºC (0.09ºF).  Over the twentieth century, snow 
cover and Arctic ice have decreased by about ten to 15%, respectively, 
since the late 1960s (when data first became available for this meas-
urement).75  Moreover, scientists predict that carbon dioxide emis-
sions from burning fossil fuels will be the dominant influence in 
trends of the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration.76  For in-
stance, assuming a constant increase in such emissions (similar to the 
record of the past twenty years), global average temperature would 
rise by 0.75ºC by 2050.77  Thus, there appears to be ample evidence 
accumulating that GHG emissions are not only capable of causing, but 
indeed are causing and will continue to cause climatic changes. 
However, what a given public nuisance plaintiff will not be able to 
establish, at least not with any high degree of certainty, is that any par-
ticular weather event, such as a flood or a heat wave, is attributable to 
anthropogenic GHG emissions.78  With respect to a public nuisance 
plaintiff requesting prospective injunctive relief, however, such a link 
is arguably not necessary.  In bringing suit to abate a public nuisance, 
a public entity is seeking to stop or mitigate an ongoing activity that 
causes harm.  While anthropogenic GHG emissions are obviously not 
72 These standards of confidence come from the Third Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in which “likely” corresponds to 
a 66%-90% chance and “very likely” corresponds to a 90%-99% chance of occurrence.  
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], WORKING GROUP I, CLI-
MATE CHANGE 2001:  THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 2 n.7 ( J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter IPCC, SCIENTIFIC BASIS]. 
73 Id. at 10. 
74 See COMM. ON THE SCI. OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLI-
MATE CHANGE SCIENCE 16 (2001), available at http://www.gcrio.org/OnLnDoc/pdf/ 
ClimateChangeScience.pdf [hereinafter NRC]. 
75 See id. 
76 IPCC, SCIENTIFIC BASIS, supra note 72, at 7. 
77 NRC, supra note 74, at 18. 
78 See Allen & Lord, supra note 69, at 552 (“[I]t will almost always be impossible to 
say that ‘but for’ GHG emissions this event would never have occurred.”).  The limits 
of attribution are also explored in this Symposium by Myles Allen et al., Scientific Chal-
lenges in the Attribution of Harm to Human Influence on Climate, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1353 
(2007). 
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responsible for all harmful weather events or even for any one particu-
lar weather event, they are responsible for increasing the risk or like-
lihood that such events will occur in the future.  Furthermore, an-
thropogenic GHG emissions are responsible for measurable changes 
in average global temperature and sea levels, changes that themselves 
cause harm in addition to elevating the risk of harmful weather 
events.  Linking anthropogenic GHGs to any particular weather event 
is not necessary where the plaintiff is not seeking past damages but is 
seeking instead to stop a harmful activity. 
The plaintiff will, however, need to establish that the defendant is 
a cause of the public nuisance.  It is likely that a court would resort to 
the “substantial factor” test rather than the “but-for” test, given that 
anthropogenic climate change is caused by more than one tortfea-
sor.79  According to this test, the conduct of all defendants that is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the harm is a cause-in-fact of the 
harm.80  On its face, “substantial factor” would seem to require that a 
defendant be responsible for a hefty amount of the sum total cause.  
Yet such a reading would place actions that degrade a commons be-
yond the reach of the common law, except where they are sufficiently 
large that they can be said to largely or measurably “cause” the degra-
dation of the commons.  Any “tragedy of the commons” would thus be 
beyond the competence of a court to address since, by definition, the 
tragedy is caused by the aggregate effect of the actions of many small 
users.81  This would also insulate from liability all small contributors, 
regardless of a given entity’s knowledge that its small contribution, 
when combined with the small contributions of others, caused the 
degradation of the commons resource.  It would, furthermore, pre-
vent the courts from addressing climate change through tort liability, 
as it is impossible to think of a single source anywhere in the world 
whose emissions are sufficiently large to be considered, in and of 
themselves, a “substantial cause” of anthropogenic climate change. 82
79 DOBBS, supra note 30, § 171 at 414-17. 
80 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) (defining legal cause). 
81 See Engel & Saleska, supra note 3, at 209 (noting that the tragedy of the com-
mons framework is based upon the neoclassical assumption that “individual market 
participants have no market power; they are merely ‘price-takers,’” and thus cannot 
themselves alter the total usage of the commons). 
82 Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457 (2007) (rejecting the EPA’s as-
sertion that, because the GHG emissions the EPA failed to regulate cannot be said to 
“cause” global warming in and of themselves, the plaintiffs were unable to establish the 
causation prong of standing because it “rests on the erroneous assumption that a small 
incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial 
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Perhaps to avoid immunizing the small contributor to a commons 
degradation from the reach of tort liability, at least one commentator 
and several cases provide a broad reading of “substantial” in the con-
text of liability for pollution harm.  Dobbs, author of a leading torts 
treatise, describes as “substantial” an individual source’s small contri-
bution to much larger pollution problems.  He states that “[w]hen no 
one polluter independently releases enough hazardous material into 
the environment to cause harm, but the entire group of polluters, 
each acting independently, collectively release an amount sufficient to 
cause harm, courts may treat each as causal.” 83  In a healthy line of 
mostly older cases, courts have ordered pollution abatement by parties 
whose contribution to a public nuisance can be accurately described 
as infinitesimal.84  In these cases, courts have upheld liability for a pub-
forum”). 
83 DOBBS, supra note 30, § 171, at 415 n.6.  Dobbs suggests four different grounds 
upon which such a conclusion may be reached: 
(a) the substantial factor approach, (b) the single indivisible injury rule . . . ; 
(c) but- for causation, which will yield a finding of causation if the entire 
group of polluters collectively contributes exactly the number of units of pol-
lution to cause harm . . . ; and (d) the argument that the group of singly insuf-
ficient causes is a variation of the duplicative cause or two fire cases where the 
total pollution is more than enough to cause harm . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted). 
84 This is especially apparent in older public nuisance environmental cases.  For 
instance, in California v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., the California Supreme Court 
held that the defendant mining operation was liable for injunctive relief.  4 P. 1152, 
1160 (Cal. 1884).  This was despite the trial judge’s remarks that 
 I am unable to say that defendant’s mine alone, without reference to the de-
bris from other mines, materially contributes to the evils mentioned; or, in 
other words, if there were no mining operations save those of the defendant, I 
am not prepared to say that it would materially injure the valley lands or the 
navigation of the river. It is the aggregate of debris from all the mines which 
produces the injuries mentioned in these findings. 
Id. at 1156 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting the trial court).  Similarly, in Woodyear 
v. Schaefer, the Maryland Court of Appeals enjoined the defendant’s butchery opera-
tions for contributing to a public nuisance, even though the defendant contributed 
only a small fraction of beef, blood, and other butchery waste products to the stream.  
57 Md. 1, 10-13 (1881).  The Court of Appeals stated that 
 [t]he extent to which the appellee has contributed to the nuisance, may be 
slight and scarcely appreciable.  Standing alone, it might well be that it would 
only, very slightly, if at all, prove a source of annoyance . . . . But it is when all 
are united together, and contribute to a common result, that they become 
important as factors, in producing the mischief complained of.  And it may 
only be after from year to year, the number of contributors to the injury has 
greatly increased, that sufficient disturbance of the appellant’s rights has been 
caused to justify a complaint. 
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lic nuisance even where the defendant was responsible for only a very 
small portion of the filth or pollution creating the nuisance and its ac-
tions, standing alone, might be considered harmless. 
The key here is that each of these cases involved only prospective 
injunctive relief, in the nature of an order requiring that the defen-
dants abate their contribution to a commons public nuisance.  None 
of the defendants was held liable for past damages in any of these 
cases.  This limitation avoids the possible due process issues that might 
otherwise arise if such minor contributors were held liable for poten-
tially enormous past damages.  Under the usual rule of joint and sev-
eral liability (holding contributors jointly and severally liable for con-
tributing to a single, indivisible harm), liability for damages could 
result in crushing and unrealistic liability for very small contributors to 
a larger environmental problem. 
It follows from these cases, and also from the logic of the appro-
priateness of the emissions offset compliance option, that no greater 
link between the defendant’s emissions and actual climatic changes 
need be established than that the defendant is emitting GHGs.  By 
definition, such gases contribute to anthropogenic climate change.  
Similarly, by definition, each ton of GHG emitted by a defendant ex-
acerbates the risks of global warming, though it is impossible to esti-
mate by exactly how much.  As established previously, the particular 
characteristics of the source of GHGs do not alter this cause-and-effect 
relationship.  Just as the location and other identifying features of a 
source are irrelevant to the abatement of global warming—thereby 
justifying the emissions offset compliance option—these same features 
 One drop of poison in a person’s cup may have no injurious effect.  But 
when a dozen, or twenty, or fifty, each put in a drop, fatal results may follow.  
It would not do to say that neither was to be held responsible. 
Id. at 10.  Further, in Lockwood Co. v. Lawrence, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
held that 
 [i]n the case at bar, it may be that the act of any one respondent alone 
might not be sufficient cause for any well grounded action on the part of the 
complainants; but when the individual acts . . . produce appreciable and seri-
ous injury, it is a single result, not traceable perhaps to any particular one of 
these respondents, but a result for which they may be liable in equity as con-
tributing to the common nuisance, as we have before stated. 
77 Me. 297, 309-310 (1885).  In a more recent Rhode Island trial court opinion, State ex 
rel. Lynch v. Lead Industries Ass’n, the court uses the language of “substantial cause,” and 
upholds liability based on each defendant’s small contribution to the state’s lead paint 
problem.  State ex rel. Lynch v. Lead Indus. Ass’n (Lead Indus. Ass’n II), No. Civ.A. 99-
5226, 2005 WL 1331196 at *2-*3 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 3, 2005).  For a discussion of 
these cases, see Pawa & Krass, supra note 9, at 450-52. 
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should be irrelevant to the defendant’s liability for contributing to a 
climate change public nuisance.  All that should matter is that the 
source contributes to global concentrations of GHGs. 
Courts adjudicating claims arising out of the public health hazards 
resulting from childhood exposure to lead-based paint have similarly 
dropped any requirement that the plaintiff link specific damages to a 
particular defendant.  For instance, to hold a previous manufacturer 
and seller of lead-based paint liable, on a public nuisance theory, for 
reimbursing the City of Milwaukee for the costs of abating lead paint 
in a private home, a Wisconsin court of appeals upheld the City’s con-
tention that it was not required to establish that the particular defen-
dant manufacturer’s paint was actually used in the home.85  It was suf-
ficient that the City prove that the manufacturer sold and promoted 
lead-based paint products to the community in which the homes were 
located and that such a “product caused a serious public health prob-
lem in that community.” 86  Similarly, in a public nuisance case 
brought by the State of Rhode Island against several lead-based paint 
companies for manufacturing and selling paint used in homes 
throughout the state, the state trial court relieved the State of the re-
quirement of identifying the presence of any particular paint manu-
facturer’s product in a particular property.87  Again, it was sufficient 
that the State demonstrate that each defendant was a substantial cause 
of the public nuisance, defined as “the collective presence of lead 
pigment in buildings throughout the state of Rhode Island.” 88
Thus, the nature of a public nuisance claim and the prospective 
nature of the relief requested support eliminating the need to match 
up the harm with a particular defendant source contributing to the 
85 See City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus. Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 893 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2004). 
86 Id. (emphasis added). 
87 See Lead Indus. Ass’n II, 2005 WL 1331196, at *2; see also State ex rel. Lynch v. 
Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. C.A. 99-5226, 2004 WL 2813747, at *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 
2004) (granting plaintiff’s motion to suppress evidence and testimony with respect to 
individual Rhode Island properties). 
88 See Lead Indus. Ass’n II, 2005 WL 1331196, at *2.  But see Chicago v. American 
Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 140 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (reaching an opposite result in 
a public nuisance action by holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate causation); 
see also Donald G. Gifford, The Death of Causation:  Mass Products Torts’ Incomplete Incorpo-
ration of Social Welfare Principles, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 997-99 (2006) (arguing 
that “[p]arens [p]atriae actions brought by states and municipalities against manufac-
turers of cigarettes, handguns and lead pigment have been the most important chal-
lenge to the individual causation requirement during the past decade” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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public nuisance.  This downplaying of the “identity” of the defendant 
is reflected in the appropriateness of the emissions offset compliance 
option in the global warming context. 
Eliminating the relevance of the defendant’s identity to its liability 
for the abatement of its future emissions will result in prospective li-
ability that is both fairly easy to establish (i.e., it will be enough to 
show that the defendant will continue to emit GHGs) and very broad.  
Some might argue the resulting liability is too broad—extending to 
any source of GHGs whatsoever, regardless of amount emitted or by 
whom it was emitted.  Ordinary homeowners are thus potential de-
fendants in a global warming public nuisance lawsuit under this analy-
sis.  While true, this need not lead to widespread hysteria.  It is highly 
unlikely that state attorneys general will be suing private homeowners 
for effectuating climate change.89  If they did, however, the option of 
compliance through the use of emissions offset credits would be even 
more critical, and would substantially alleviate the burden of such li-
ability, turning public nuisance lawsuits into a type of carbon tax.90
D.  “The Reasonableness” Determination 
Finally, the option of compliance through the use of third-party 
emissions offset credits should add to the number of circumstances 
where the defendant GHG emitter’s conduct is considered “unrea-
sonable” and hence to the number of situations where it may be held 
liable for causing a public nuisance.  Although neither uniformly fol-
lowed by courts 91 nor met with the universal approval of legal com-
mentators,92 standard doctrine holds that to be held liable for a public 
89 Private parties can sue for a public nuisance if they show “special damages.”  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. c (1979).  While it may be difficult to 
demonstrate such damages, one can imagine situations where it may be possible, such 
as a large coastal landowner that is peculiarly susceptible to sea level rise. 
90 See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individ-
ual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (suggesting the use of carbon offsets to help 
individuals achieve the social norm of carbon neutrality). 
91 See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (“This court has not 
quite the same freedom to balance the harm that will be done by an injunction [when 
a State is a party], that it would have in deciding between two subjects of a single po-
litical power.”). 
92 See Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance:  
A Comparison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 377-
79 (1990) (arguing that the balancing of the utilities has no place in public nuisance 
where the harm alleged is a substantial violation of a public right and the case is 
brought by a sovereign that has a special responsibility to protect such rights). 
  
2007] HARMONIZING APPROACHES TO CLIMATE CHANGE 1593 
 
nuisance, a defendant’s conduct must be “unreasonable.”  Unreason-
ableness is defined, at least in part, through a balancing-of-the-utilities 
test.93  In other words, the defendant’s conduct is considered unrea-
sonable if, among other things, the gravity of the harm to the public 
outweighs the utility of the defendant’s conduct. 
The fungibility of GHG emissions potentially tilts the unreason-
ableness determination in favor of the plaintiff by rendering it 
cheaper and easier for the defendant to comply with an abatement 
order, and hence reducing the likelihood that a finding of liability 
would require the sacrifice of the defendant’s business and its associ-
ated utility, either to the defendant or to society as a whole. 
The fungibility of GHG emissions is a critical component of a suc-
cessful scheme to use public nuisance to compel reductions in GHG 
emissions.  Fungibility functions on two levels in this scheme:  it both 
supports liability by further justifying a relaxed standard of causation 
(further than already justified by the “public” nature of public nui-
sance) and it supports a cost-effective compliance mechanism to meet 
the burdens of this expanded liability.  These two components are 
mutually reinforcing, as seen by the impact of the option of an emis-
sions credit compliance scheme upon the likelihood that a defendant 
emitter’s conduct will be considered “unreasonable.” 
III.  COULD TORT ACTIONS JUMPSTART  
AN EMISSIONS TRADING MARKET? 
Should liability be found and the precedent from such lawsuits 
prove sufficiently intimidating to defendants, this Article makes the 
further claim that the availability of the emissions offset compliance 
option in public nuisance climate change lawsuits could jumpstart a 
market in GHG emissions offsets.  The claim is that a single or several 
cases in which defendants choose to comply with an abatement order 
through the purchase of emissions offsets could trigger a demand for 
offsets.  At least some sources of GHGs might be expected to scramble 
to create such offsets by adopting permanent measures to reduce their 
GHG emissions.  In reducing their emissions, these sources generate 
revenue through the sale of emissions offsets and reduce the likeli-
hood that they themselves will become the target of litigation.  While 
93 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B, 826 (setting out the parameters 
of the reasonableness determination); see, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield, 
40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (providing an example of the applica-
tion of this test). 
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there are obviously many “but ifs” in this scenario, it is at least plausi-
ble that, were defendants offered the option of complying with an 
abatement order using third-party-generated GHG emissions offset 
credits, a private emissions trading market of potentially national 
scope could be triggered. 
Perhaps the largest hurdle to actually triggering such a market is 
the absence of a readily identifiable standard that a court may use to 
determine the appropriate degree by which an individual defendant’s 
GHG emissions must be abated, and hence the number of emissions 
offset credits a source must hold.  Despite the attractiveness of “car-
bon neutrality,” a court is unlikely to go so far as to require the 
abatement of 100% of a source’s GHG emissions.  Such a requirement 
is likely to constitute crippling liability that might result in the termi-
nation of many socially important industries and companies, even as-
suming the availability of the cheaper option of compliance with emis-
sions offsets.  Additionally, there is the potential unfairness of such a 
result, as it would be distributed according to which particular indus-
tries were unlucky enough to be sued in public nuisance by public au-
thorities. 
Nevertheless, the basis upon which a court might require a defen-
dant source to reduce its GHG emissions by any percentage other 
than 100% is not obviously clear.  How to allocate the emissions re-
ductions that are needed to avoid even the most serious harms from 
climate change is perhaps the most important economic, social, envi-
ronmental, and political issue of our time.  Yet it is a question that has 
eluded comprehensive international agreement so far,94 though not 
for want of proposals.95  It is difficult to see how a single common law 
court might answer such a difficult question with respect to a single 
defendant in the absence of guidance from the political branches.  In 
the public nuisance case filed by mostly northeastern states against 
midwestern and southern utilities, the plaintiffs have so far fudged on 
the issue, declining to be more specific than to request a court to 
abate defendants’ emissions “by a specified percentage each year for 
94 For example, the Kyoto Protocol has failed to garner the support of all of the 
world’s industrialized nations, failing to attract the United States as a party.  Further-
more, Kyoto’s emissions reduction allocation applies only to industrialized nations and 
only through the target compliance period of 2008–2012. 
95 Many commentators argue that the earth’s natural GHG assimilative capacity 
should be distributed on a per capita basis.  See Paul Baer et al., Equity and Greenhouse 
Gas Responsibility, 289 SCIENCE 2287 (2000); Michael Grubb, Seeking Fair Weather:  Ethics 
and the International Debate on Climate Change, 71 INT’L AFF. 463, 485 (1995). 
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at least a decade.” 96  In the absence of a more particularized request 
and justification, it is perhaps not wholly surprising that a federal dis-
trict court dismissed the states’ complaint as presenting a nonjusticia-
ble political question.97
An easy solution to this problem would be for the legislature of 
the suing state to enact legislation specifying the percentage of 
abatement required of defendants in public nuisance GHG emissions 
lawsuits.  Several states now regulate the GHG emissions of particular 
industries, such as electric utilities.98  In legislating an abatement per-
centage applicable in public nuisance cases, states would simply be 
applying their legislative rule to tort lawsuits arising under state law.  
Conversely, those states lacking GHG emissions reductions regulations 
would simply be adopting such regulations for the first time in the 
form of an abatement rule.  Precedent for state legislative control of 
common law remedies is found in the many state “tort reform” stat-
utes capping or otherwise restricting the amount of punitive damages 
in personal injury lawsuits.99
Nevertheless, while helpful, it is not clear that a legislated stan-
dard of abatement is necessary to a judicial abatement remedy.  Tradi-
tionally, the function of equity is to reconcile competing claims, 
reaching an adjustment that takes into account the interests of all par-
ties.100  This gives such a court the flexibility to fashion an abatement 
96 Complaint, supra note 1, at 49. 
97 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (2005).  The rul-
ing was clearly motivated by the court’s concern that, given that the problem of an-
thropogenic climate change is attributable to GHG emissions across the globe, it had 
no basis upon which to impose an abatement requirement in the absence of a deter-
mination by a relevant political body.  The court noted that the plaintiff’s requested 
relief, “would, at a minimum, require this Court to:  (1) determine the appropriate 
level at which to cap the carbon dioxide emissions of these Defendants; (2) determine 
the appropriate percentage reduction to impose upon Defendants[,] . . . all without an 
“initial policy determination” having been made by the elected branches.” Id. at 272-
73. 
98 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
99 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2005) (capping 
awards of punitive damages at $350,000 and prohibiting a state court from entering a 
judgment for punitive damages in excess of the lesser of two times the amount of 
compensatory damages or 10% of the employer’s net worth). 
100 See e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (“The essence 
of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould 
each decree to the necessities of the particular case.  Flexibility rather than rigidity has 
distinguished it.” (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944))); Spur In-
dus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 707 (Ariz. 1972) (“The law of nui-
sance affords no rigid rule to be applied in all instances.  It is elastic.  It undertakes to 
require only that which is fair and reasonable under all the circumstances.” (quoting 
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remedy as it sees fit regardless of the absence of a clear standard for 
how much abatement should be achieved. 
Arguably, a court already has positive law standards upon which it 
can draw in fashioning its own common law abatement remedy.  For 
instance, a court might look at the degree of abatement some of the 
plaintiff states are requiring of their own industries.  This would be 
consistent with the role of public nuisance as a vehicle by which states 
can level the competitive playing field between in-state and out-of-state 
sources.101  Thus in determining the proper amount of abatement by 
the out-of-state sources being sued, a court might look to the degree 
of GHG emissions reductions New York is requiring of its own utilities 
and the limits on carbon dioxide emissions California is requiring of 
in-state car manufacturers.  In the alternative, a court could do what 
Congress often resorts to in defining the best available technology—
look at some segment of the industry leaders.102
In sum, given various conditions, providing the option of comply-
ing with court-ordered abatement through the purchase of third-party 
emissions offsets could trigger a GHG emissions trading market, even 
in the absence of federal authorizing legislation.  The development of 
such a market would be helped by a legislated state standard specify-
ing the required degree of abatement. 
IV.  IMPLEMENTATION HURDLES 
A.  Demonstrating Actual Emissions Reductions 
Courts may embrace emissions offsets as an innovative option for 
enhancing the efficiency of common law compliance.  Alternatively, 
courts may resist the idea for any number of reasons, including a 
judge’s practical concern over the lack of an easy method of verifying 
the adequacy of the defendant’s evidence of third-party offsets.  
Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 104 N.E. 371, 373 (Mass. 1914))).  Boomer v. Atl. 
Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970) (“[T]o follow the rule [that an injunc-
tion must issue even when enjoinment would be more costly than the nuisance] liter-
ally in these cases would be to close the plant down at once.  This court is fully agreed 
to avoid that immediately drastic remedy . . . .”). 
101 See supra text accompanying notes 31-37. 
102 For example, the Clean Air Act uses a “maximum achievable control technol-
ogy” standard for new sources that is determined by “the average emission limitation 
achieved by the best performing 12 percent of existing sources.”  Clean Air Act § 
112(d)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(A) (2000); see also 40 C.F.R. § 63.51 (2005) (de-
fining the maximum achievable control technology). 
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Courts also may be concerned that they will not be able to distinguish 
“real” offsets from “paper” offsets—offsets demonstrated on paper, 
which are not reflected in actual emissions reductions.  This section 
analogizes the difficulties that a common law court may face in verify-
ing emissions offsets to the difficulties confronted by parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol in determining whether the funders of projects in de-
veloping countries designed to reduce GHG emissions should receive 
emissions credits under the Protocol’s Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM).  This section will also propose a solution:  courts should 
take advantage of the GHG emissions trading schemes already estab-
lished by other countries, as well as by private entities by recognizing 
as valid offsets the GHG emissions allowances traded under such re-
gimes.  Currently, there exists only one GHG emissions trading 
scheme established by a foreign government:  the European Union’s 
emissions trading scheme.  However, there are now several private 
GHG exchanges which may be candidate sources of offset credits. 
B.  The Challenges Posed by a Judicially Created  
Open Market Trading Program 
By necessity, any emissions trading authorized by a public nui-
sance judicial remedy would be an “open market” trading program, as 
opposed to a cap-and-trade program.  Under an open market pro-
gram, sources reduce their emissions below regulatorily required lev-
els and trade such reductions, expressed as “credits,” to sources whose 
emissions exceed regulatory levels.  Under the regulatory regime cur-
rently in effect, the source purchasing the credits may emit higher-
than-regulated levels of emissions so long as it holds credits equal to 
those excess emissions.  By contrast, under a cap-and-trade program, 
the total amount of pollution that can be emitted by all sources is 
capped and each source is distributed a share of that capped amount 
(in the form of allowances), which is subject to trading rules.  Argua-
bly the most important element in both trading systems is the integrity 
of the cap on allowable pollution, as only allowable pollution can be 
traded and still meet regulatory goals.  Under a cap-and-trade system, 
the cap is established up front and as a result it is very clear what emis-
sions can be traded—only those represented by an allowance.  Under 
an open market system, the cap is the sum total of all of the regulatory 
standards applicable to each individual source, or each source’s indi-
vidual “cap.”  This cap upon total emissions is far less easily deter-
mined and is subject to stretching and distortion as a result of each 
source’s ability to create tradable credits through individual source 
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reductions.103  Only if each credit created truly represents emissions 
reductions that are in addition to those otherwise required by the 
regulatory program, is the integrity of the cap maintained. 
The challenges facing a court in verifying that any GHG credit of-
fered by a source to comply with a nuisance abatement order thus 
mirror those faced by the parties to the Kyoto Protocol when deter-
mining the conditions under which sources may obtain GHG emis-
sions credits under the CDM, an international open market trading 
program.  Under the CDM, the industrialized nation parties to the 
Protocol may obtain credit toward their Protocol emissions reduction 
target by funding projects that reduce emissions in developing coun-
tries.104  Because such countries are not subject to the Protocol’s emis-
sions reduction target (1990 levels by 2008–2012), such trading is, by 
definition, an “open market” system.  Designers of the CDM must en-
sure that such projects achieve reductions that are truly “additional” 
to those that would otherwise occur in the normal course of events; 105 
otherwise, the reductions achieved will not offset the emissions of 
sources within nations subject to the Kyoto Protocol and their use will 
not be neutral as to climate change, but will accentuate it.106
103 For further information on the two types of trading systems and examples of 
their implementation, see Richard E. Ayres, Expanding the Use of Environmental Trading 
Programs into New Areas of Environmental Regulation, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 94 
(2000). 
104 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, art. 12, 37 I.L.M. at 38. 
105 Id. 
106 For example, suppose a corporation in Germany proposes a CDM project in a 
developing nation that will convert a large boiler from coal to natural gas.  To permit 
the corporation to obtain credits for the conversion toward the corporation’s share of 
Germany’s emissions reduction obligation under the Kyoto Protocol, the corporation 
would have to demonstrate that the conversion would not have happened in the ab-
sence of its investment.  See STEPHEN MEYERS, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY 
NAT’L LAB., ADDITIONALITY OF EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS FROM CLEAN DEVELOPMENT 
MECHANISM PROJECTS:  ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR PROJECT-LEVEL ASSESSMENT 9 (1999), 
available at http://ies.lbl.gov/iespubs/43704.pdf.  The governing body of the CDM has 
established guidelines for determining when the emissions reductions achieved by a 
project are additional.  Only reductions meeting these guidelines can generate credits 
for its funders that should be considered to be part of the nation’s baseline emissions.  
In essence, the project proponent must demonstrate that due to various factors such as 
the existence of credible and realistic alternatives to the project and the financial unat-
tractiveness of the project, the project would not likely be pursued in the host country 
in the absence of the incentive provided by CDM emissions credits.  See Sixteenth 
Meeting of the Executive Board, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 21-22, 2004, Tool for the Demonstra-
tion and Assessment of Additionality (Annex 1), available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/ 
EB/016/eb16repan1.pdf; see also MISSION INTERMINISTÉRIELLE DE L’EFFET DE SERRE ET 
AL., CLIMATE CHANGE:  GUIDE TO THE KYOTO PROTOCOL PROJECT MECHANISMS 15-18 
(2d ed. 2004) (Fr.). 
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The example provided by CDM demonstrates the potential diffi-
culties facing a court in determining whether GHG emissions reduc-
tions procured by a defendant subject to a court abatement order will 
truly offset its emissions.  Assuming the court places upon the defen-
dant the burden of demonstrating that the emissions are additional—
or surplus—to any reductions that would occur in the absence of the 
contract, the court must still evaluate whether the defendant has met 
this burden with evidence demonstrating that, in the absence of the 
funding provided by the credit sale, the project generating the emis-
sions reductions would be unlikely to occur. 
C.  “Preapproved” Sources of GHG Emissions Credits 
This section proposes that defendants and courts take advantage 
of the existence of GHG emissions credit exchange programs already 
in existence to alleviate the evidentiary burdens discussed in the pre-
vious section.  Thus, for purposes of satisfying a defendant’s court-
ordered abatement obligation, a court might accept as valid offsets 
emissions credits obtained from a government-sanctioned or a private 
GHG emissions exchange.  This would save the court from the neces-
sity of screening each credit offered by the defendant to ensure it met 
the criteria for additionality discussed in the prior section. 
The court will still need to satisfy itself that the exchange program 
has systems in place that ensure that all credits transferred on the ex-
change meet criteria needed to guarantee that the credit is surplus, 
additional, and permanent.  Nevertheless, a court is likely to be much 
more comfortable with performing such a program-wide review than 
with determining whether the same criteria are met with respect to 
each credit generated through an individual emissions-credit-
generating project.  By taking advantage of the system of rules and 
monitoring put in place by existing emissions exchange programs, a 
court can substantially reduce the uncertainty involved in allowing de-
fendants to use emissions offsets to comply with court-ordered abate-
ment.  This should, in turn, make courts more willing to recognize off-
sets as a compliance option. 
1.  EU GHG Allowances 
At present, the only government-supervised GHG emissions trad-
ing regime is that established by the EU.  The EU’s emissions trading 
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scheme, begun in January 2005, is the largest company-level scheme 
for trading carbon dioxide emissions credits in the world.107  The EU 
as a whole is bound by the emissions cap required by the Kyoto Proto-
col, a reduction of 8% from 1990 levels by the end of the Kyoto com-
mitment period of 2008–2012.  Each EU country has a separate emis-
sions cap established under the EU’s burden-sharing agreement.108  
Emissions allowances equal to approximately 90%-95% of each coun-
try’s cap are distributed for free to regulated parties by their national 
government.109  In addition, the EU scheme allows companies to ob-
tain credits generated through the Kyoto Protocol’s joint implementa-
tion and CDM, thus expanding the number of credits available for ex-
change.  EU-distributed allowances are freely tradable between 
regulated parties and between nonregulated parties, such as nongov-
ernmental organizations and individuals.110  However, this may not be 
true of the credits generated through the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible 
mechanisms, known as “Certified Emissions Reductions,” or CERs.111
Because EU emissions allowances are generated under an emis-
sions trading regime established with a cap, a U.S. court should be sat-
isfied that such allowances are “additional” and, hence, valid to offset 
the emissions of a defendant subject to a GHG abatement order.  
Similarly, EU allowances would satisfy the requirement that reductions 
be surplus and permanent. 
Trading between companies in the EU and those located in coun-
tries outside the EU is currently permitted under EU trading rules.112  
In determining whether to accept a defendant’s use of EU emissions 
credits to comply with a public nuisance abatement order, a U.S. court 
might nevertheless be concerned that the EU program would break 
107 EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 7, at 3. 
108 Id. at 5. 
109 Id. at 9. 
110 See id. at 3-5, 19. 
111 Cf. Glenn Wiser, Frontiers in Trade:  The Clean Development Mechanism and the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services, 2 INT’L J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 288, 304 (2002), 
available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Frontiers_CDM_Wiser.pdf (stating that 
under rules being established for the trading of emissions credits generated through 
joint implementation and the CDM, “any trader whose home government is not Party 
to the [Kyoto] Protocol will not be able to ‘own’ CERs, though it may still be able to 
provide financial services relating to their trade”). 
112 See, e.g., Fred Pearce, European Trading in Carbon-Emission Permits Begins, NEW 
SCIENTIST, Jan. 6, 2005, http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn6846 (“Coun-
tries outside the EU, such as Norway, have already said they would like to join and issue 
their companies with emissions allocations that could, in the future, be traded on the 
EU market.”). 
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down if too many EU allowances are siphoned out of the EU market 
and used by U.S. companies to satisfy emissions reduction obligations 
in the United States.113  While a few such instances are unlikely to 
cause much consternation, numerous instances might raise the ire of 
the EU companies subject to the EU emissions cap.  Such companies 
are currently relying upon the availability of credits at reasonable 
prices for their own compliance with their individual emissions alloca-
tion under their national cap.  Should the purchases of EU allowances 
by defendants in U.S. tort lawsuits make a sizable dent in the supply of 
excess allowances, the costs of compliance for these EU companies 
could soar. 
For a number of reasons, however, this risk might be worth taking.  
First, it is unlikely, even assuming that a large number of abatement 
orders are issued in the United States, that a judicial willingness to ac-
cept EU allowances as evidence of offsets would have a large effect 
upon the price of EU allowances.  Importantly, the EU emissions trad-
ing market is not a closed market; the fact that CERs, obtained by EU 
companies through joint implementation and CDM projects, can be 
used for compliance implies that the pool of available allowances for 
EU parties is subject to continual expansion.  Although CERs probably 
cannot be purchased by U.S. companies because the United States is 
not a party to the Kyoto Protocol, they can be freely traded between 
EU companies. 
Second, even if U.S. demand for EU allowances—communicated 
through the tort system—drives up the price of EU allowances, it is al-
together possible that this development might be welcomed, as op-
posed to feared.  The price of EU allowances recently took a sharp 
drop when it was discovered that some EU nations had imposed such 
generous caps upon their industries that few reductions would be re-
quired.114  By driving up the price of allowances, U.S. demand could 
stimulate the emissions reductions that the EU needs to meet its 
Kyoto targets. 
Finally, the use of EU allowances could significantly aid in jump-
starting a U.S. emissions trading market.  A U.S. market is key to the 
113 Cf. WILLIAM BLYTH & MARTINA BOSI, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY & OECD, LINKING 
NON-EU DOMESTIC EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES WITH THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING 
SCHEME 25 (2004), available at http://www.iea.org/textbase/papers/2004/non_eu.pdf 
(discussing potential economic distortions caused by the reallocation of emissions 
credits).
114 Oliver Tickell, Prospect of Tighter Euro Allowances Boosts Price, TIMES (UK), Mar. 
30, 2007 at 10, available at 2007 WLNR 6009369. 
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eventual development of U.S. participation in an international GHG 
regulatory regime.  EU authorities may recognize the value of permit-
ting U.S. GHG sources to use EU allowances for tort compliance pur-
poses as the first step toward broader U.S. participation in such an in-
ternational regime. 
2.  Private GHG Exchanges 
Another potential source of “preapproved” GHG emissions credits 
for U.S. tort defendants are those exchanged on private markets.  One 
such market—advertising itself as the only “voluntary but legally bind-
ing” GHG emissions market—is the Chicago Climate Exchange 
(CCX).115  CCX is a membership organization in which each member 
agrees to abide by an individual cap equal to a reduction in emissions 
of 1% per year, using its average output from 1998 to 2001 as a base-
line.  Members can comply with their cap through the purchase of 
Carbon Financial Instruments, which are equivalent to the right to 
emit 100 tons of carbon under the CCX cap. 
The CCX has been criticized as not being sufficiently stringent to 
make any real difference in companies’ contributions to climate 
change.  Nevertheless, for present purposes, the important question is 
whether the CCX, or others like it, might function as an acceptable 
source of offsets that could be used by U.S. tort defendants to comply 
with judicially imposed GHG abatement orders.  A court would have 
to scrutinize the mechanisms in place to determine whether the cred-
its generated by, and available to, members constitute real, additional, 
surplus, and permanent emissions reductions. 
In addition to the voluntary GHG exchange represented by CCX, 
a plethora of private entities now provide GHG offsets as well as ser-
vices needed to seek out and procure such offsets.116  As opposed to a 
large private exchange such as CCX, such entities are likely to have in 
place fewer safeguards to ensure that credits obtained are truly sur-
plus, additional, and permanent, and thus their use to satisfy a judi-
cially imposed abatement order would entail more judicial scrutiny.  
Nevertheless, because they have probably been subject to some scru-
115 See Chicago Climate Exchange, http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/ (last visited 
May 1, 2007). 
116 See Jeannie Kever, For Our Planet’s Health, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 18, 2007 at *2, 
available at 2007 WLNR 5214777 (noting the growing availability of vendors selling 
carbon offsets); Jack Cox, Wedded to a Clean World, DENVER POST, May 8, 2006, at F1, 
available at 2006 WLNR 8114824 (same). 
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tiny, the credits offered by such private entities may require less judi-
cial scrutiny than credits obtained from the defendant’s simple in-
vestment in a credit-generating project similar to the CDM process. 
CONCLUSION 
In the absence of a mandatory federal emissions reduction pro-
gram in the United States, state governments are turning to the 
courts, seeking to augment emerging state-level GHG regulatory pro-
grams with controls upon major out-of-state sources of GHGs.  These 
lawsuits provide a rare opportunity for the courts to incorporate emis-
sions trading into common law remedies, thereby potentially jump-
starting a GHG emissions trading market even in the absence of fed-
eral authorizing legislation.  The trade of GHG emissions reductions 
is a hallmark of just about every climate change regulatory scheme be-
ing implemented or proposed at the international, national, and sub-
national levels of government.  In incorporating emissions trading 
into their common law remedies, courts would be playing a valuable 
role of providing the framework for an intermediate climate change 
regulatory regime and thereby reducing the costs of an eventual fed-
eral cap-and-trade program. 
Implementation of such an innovative judicial remedy will require 
the resolution of many other issues, such as the liability of the defen-
dant and the legitimacy of emissions reduction credits, to name just 
two major hurdles.  This Article has suggested approaches to both of 
these essential issues by arguing, for example, that the plaintiff’s bur-
den of demonstrating causation should be considered within the con-
text of climate change as a global tragedy of the commons.  Similarly, 
although the lack of a U.S. carbon dioxide emissions cap makes it 
more difficult for courts to determine whether emissions offsets prof-
fered by a defendant truly offset its emissions, this Article has sug-
gested that this problem would be somewhat alleviated were courts to 
allow defendants to use GHG emissions credits generated under a cap 
in other nations’ programs (such as the EU trading scheme), as well 
as credits generated on private exchanges in the United States. 
 
